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NOTE
A GLOBAL NETWORK FOR TREASON: THE
INTERNET’S IMPERMISSIBLE BROADENING
OF THE CLASS OF DEATH-ELIGIBLE
DEFENDANTS UNDER § 904 OF THE
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
Alexander J. Hendricks*
The cases of Pfc. Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden have gen-
erated controversy and debate across the United States.  Both individu-
als took to the Internet to release classified operational details of the
United States government.  Supporters of Manning and Snowden label
the two as heroes and argue that the decision to release the information
was motivated by the need for transparency and accountability.  The op-
position condemns Snowden and Manning as traitors that deliberately
provided the enemies of the United States with information that could be
used for injurious purposes.  Undoubtedly, the government of the United
States is in the latter camp as revealed by its prosecutorial decisions.
Though it has been unable to capture Snowden, the United States was
able to subject Manning and charge him with a capital offense under
§ 904 of the Uniform Military Code of Justice, better known as Aiding
the Enemy.
Manning was ultimately acquitted of Aiding the Enemy, but the facts
of Manning’s case and the hypothetical case against Snowden generate a
need to reevaluate the validity of § 904’s death penalty in the Internet
era, where the transmission and exchange of information has reached a
level of fluidity that was inconceivable at the enactment of § 904.  This
Note conducts that evaluation and concludes that executing a defendant
under § 904 is “cruel and unusual punishment” and violates the Eighth
Amendment.  Section 904 violates the Eighth Amendment because the In-
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ternet stripped the genuine narrowing function from the implicit aggra-
vating circumstance of § 904.  The Internet rendered the aggravating
circumstance functionless by making all those who transact on its net-
works fulfill the mens rea standard that is required for death eligibility
under § 904.  Because the Internet removes the narrowing function from
the aggravating circumstance, the jury and prosecutor have unfettered
discretion to pick from an impermissibly broad class of death-eligible
defendants.  This unfettered discretion drastically increases the risk for
arbitrary death sentencing in violation of Furman and Gregg, which
jointly held that a death sentence given without a meaningful basis is
cruel and unusual punishment.  Consequently, § 904 must be modified to
heighten the mens rea required for death eligibility under § 904 to be a
viable capital offense in the Internet era.
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INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) contains thirteen
non-homicide offenses where execution is an available punishment.1
One of these offenses, Aiding the Enemy (§ 904), has received notoriety
recently because of the court martial of Pfc. Bradley Manning and the
attempted extradition of Edward Snowden from Russia.  Section 904 de-
tails in part that “any person who . . . knowingly . . . gives intelligence
to . . . the enemy, either directly or indirectly; shall suffer death or other
such punishment as a court-martial or military commission may direct.”2
Manning and Snowden’s cases both involve the knowing, but indi-
rect, distribution of classified material to enemies of the United States.
Manning gave classified military documents concerning the Iraq and Af-
ghanistan wars to Julian Assange of the online confidential-document
database Wikileaks, while Snowden disclosed to media outlets the opera-
tional details of the United States National Security Agency’s (NSA) sur-
veillance program.3  In both cases, the secondary parties4 circulated the
classified information globally.5
During the military tribunal of Manning, military prosecutors ar-
gued that under § 904 Manning distributed confidential intelligence to
sources he knew would publish the information worldwide.6  Manning
1 10 U.S.C. §§ 877–920 (2012).
2 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
3 Julie Tate, Bradley Manning Declines to Enter Plea at Court-Martial, WASH. POST,
Feb. 23, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/bradley-manning-de
clines-to-enter-plea-at-court-martial/2012/02/23/gIQAhLF6VR_story.html; Devin Barrett &
Danny Yadron, Contractor Says He Is Source of NSA Leak, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2013, http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323495604578535653583992418.
4 See infra Part II.A (explaining the operational definition of “secondary parties”).
5 James Ball, NSA Monitored Calls of 35 World Leaders After US Official Handed Over
Contacts, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-
surveillance-world-leaders-calls.
6 Eyder Peralta, What the Manning Verdict Says About Edward Snowden’s Future,
NPR: THE TWO-WAY (July 30, 2013, 5:28 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/
07/30/207042272/what-the-manning-verdict-says-about-edward-snowdens-future.
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thus implicitly knew the classified information would indirectly reach
enemies of the United States because of its worldwide accessibility via
the Internet.7  Military prosecutors would likely make a similar argument
regarding Snowden’s release of confidential information to the Washing-
ton Post.  Although their fact patterns satisfy the elements of § 904,
Manning and Snowden’s cases exemplify the constitutional defect of
§ 904 being a capital offense.
This Note argues that Congress employed an implicit statutory-ag-
gravating circumstance in § 904 to limit the military commission’s dis-
cretion in the eligibility phase of death sentencing.8  The knowledge that
information would reach the enemy, either directly or indirectly, histori-
cally narrowed the class of defendants who were eligible for execution
under the UCMJ.  The development of the Internet, however, divested
the circumstance of its narrowing function.  The Internet’s open-source
nature creates a presumption among Internet users that their transmis-
sions are not privacy protected.  People who post information to the In-
ternet cannot reasonably assert that they believed their transmissions on
the network were accessible exclusively to the transmitter and the recipi-
ent.  Because Internet users know their online transmissions are globally
accessible, they implicitly know that enemies of the United States have
access to those transmissions.  While an Internet user may not transmit
information with the intent that the communications reach enemies,
knowledge that an enemy will receive the information is sufficient for a
defendant to be eligible for capital punishment under § 904.9  Therefore,
any person who transmits online information that a military commission
construes as providing aid to the enemy meets the mental state of knowl-
edge that historically has served as a narrowing circumstance, and that
person may be eligible for execution.10  This death-eligible class that
§ 904 produces—any Internet user who transmits confidential informa-
tion—is impermissibly broad and provides for a high risk of arbitrary
capital decision making by a military commission.  Section 904’s im-
plicit aggravating circumstance does not produce a subclass of offenders
who are particularly culpable, but instead affords the military commis-
sion unfettered discretion in deciding which Internet users are eligible for
death.  This unfettered discretion is what the Supreme Court in Furman
explicitly deemed unconstitutional as an arbitrary and capricious exercise
7 Id.
8 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
9 Id.
10 Transmission includes not only the original uploading of the information to the In-
ternet, but any reposting of illicit information previously uploaded because that repost height-
ens the visibility of the formerly confidential information.
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of the death penalty.11  The arbitrary and capricious nature of § 904’s
eligibility phase violates the Eighth Amendment and makes the statute
constitutionally invalid.
This Note will begin with a preliminary section that: (1) addresses
the scope and terminology of the Note; (2) provides a justification for
reviewing § 904 in light of its legislative history; and (3) discusses the
applicability of § 904 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to civil-
ians.  Part I of this Note will provide an historical overview of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence with an emphasis on the function of circum-
stances that narrow the class of death-eligible defendants.  Part II will
examine the historical success of “knowledge of enemy receipt of infor-
mation” as a narrowing circumstance in statutes that predated § 904.
Part III will explain why the Internet stripped the “knowledge of enemy
receipt” of its narrowing function through the Manning and Snowden
cases.  Part IV will conclude with prescriptions for amending § 904’s
implicit circumstance so that it genuinely narrows the class of death-
eligible defendants.
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
A. Scope and Terminology of the Note
This Note isolates one constitutional field and addresses its impact
on a capital punishment scheme; however, there are relevant issues that
cannot be included within the Note for efficiency purposes.  Two signifi-
cant issues include: (1) the potential constitutional conflict between the
First Amendment’s protections of speech and a speech-based capital of-
fense; and (2) the complexity of prosecuting a corporate entity for a capi-
tal crime.  While these issues bear heavily on any valid review of § 904,
there is insufficient space and time to give each of these topics the neces-
sary analysis.  To dispose of these concerns in an efficient manner, two
operating conditions will be in place for this Note: (1) the transmitters
are aware that the content is illegal and cannot rely on freedom of speech
to exculpate them from liability; and (2) media corporations are persons
liable for prosecution for a capital crime.
This Note will refer to Manning, Snowden, and any party who ac-
quires the classified information from its original source as the “primary
parties.”  The primary parties’ defining feature is that they acquired the
information from the original source and are the first party to break the
confidentiality of the information.  All other parties who acquire the in-
11 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256–57 (1972) (reversing a death sentence
penalty and holding that the death sentencing process as applied was cruel and unusual punish-
ment because the jury had unrestricted sentencing discretion that could result in arbitrary
sentencing).
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formation after the primary parties are “secondary parties.”  These secon-
dary parties can acquire the information either directly from the primary
party or from another secondary party.  Examples of secondary parties
include the media outlets who receive information and redistribute it on
their forums and the Internet users who redistribute the information once
the information is on the Internet.  The designations of “primary” or
“secondary” parties have no bearing on the parties’ culpabilities.
B. Justifying Review of § 904 After the 2006 Amendment
Congress authorized § 904 in 1956.12  Since its enactment, Con-
gress amended the statute only once, in 2006, and in an area unrelated to
the aggravating circumstance.13  The continuity of the implicit aggravat-
ing circumstance indicates legislative confidence in § 904’s ability to
narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty.  The recent-
ness of the review suggests there should be deference to Congress, and
that the statute should not face the substantive scrutiny this Note purports
to conduct.
The Supreme Court recognizes the decisions of legislatures as an
“objective indicia that reflect[s] the public attitude toward a given sanc-
tion.”14  The Supreme Court has also ruled, however, that the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments cannot
be “fastened to the obsolete.”15  Although legislative decisions on a capi-
tal punishment statute assure “obsolete” societal values do not justify the
statute, congressional action or inaction does not insulate the statute from
constitutional challenges not asserting an “evolving standards of de-
cency” argument.16  While legislative decisions codify contemporary
moral values and communal standards of decency,17 they are not disposi-
tive for the type of procedural challenge advanced by this Note.  This
Note advances a procedural challenge based on the diminished function-
ality of an implicit aggravating circumstance, not an argument for a new-
found moral repugnancy to the death penalty.  Consequently, the recent
legislative affirmation of § 904 does not preempt the type of review ad-
vanced by this Note.
12 10 U.S.C. § 904 (1956).
13 Military Commissions Act, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
14 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
15 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
16 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (establishing the validity of a challenge to
a capital punishment scheme due to the evolving standards of decency of a maturing society).
17 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) (explaining how legislative deci-
sions are highly indicative of “contemporary standards”).
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C. Application of § 904 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice to
Civilians
A final preliminary challenge to the type of review conducted in this
Note is that the UCMJ does not apply to civilians, and consequently the
concern about § 904 applying to an impermissibly broad class of defend-
ants is preempted by its limited applicability to military personnel.  This
argument is supported by the definitional article of the UCMJ, which
circumscribes the persons subject to the UCMJ chapter to an enumerated
list of military personnel.18
Though this argument is valid for the majority of the punitive arti-
cles contained within the UCMJ, § 904’s applicability is not limited just
to “any person subject to this chapter,” as in the majority of punitive
articles.19  Instead, § 904 reads “Any person who . . . shall suffer death,”
a textual deviation from the common pattern of the UCMJ written inten-
tionally to broaden § 904’s scope beyond military personnel.20  Conse-
quently, it cannot be said that the concerns of this Note are invalid
because the UCMJ applies only to military personnel, as § 904 is in the
unique position of being applicable to civilians, which is reflected in the
text of the Note.
I. HISTORIC EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND NARROWING JURISPRUDENCE
RELEVANT TO § 904
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unu-
sual punishments.”21  Through its jurisprudence, the Supreme Court de-
fined when a statutory scheme’s implementation of the death penalty is
“cruel and unusual” and legitimized statutory mechanisms that can make
capital schemes comport with the Eighth Amendment.22
In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Brennan noted that “cruel and unu-
sual” is “not susceptible to precise definition.”23  Indicative of the diffi-
culty of defining “cruel and unusual punishment” is that no unified
opinion emerged from Furman.24  Although the Justices did not decide if
the death penalty is per se cruel and unusual, the case established that
when a jury’s discretion is unfettered, the risk of the arbitrary imposition
of the death penalty is too high, making the death penalty cruel and unu-
18 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2012).
19 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 881 (2012) (“Any person subject to this chapter”); 10 U.S.C.
§ 885 (2012) (“Any member of the armed forces”).
20 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
22 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (finding that the impo-
sition of the death penalty by courts in Georgia and Texas violated the Eighth Amendment).
23 Id. at 258 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
24 See id. at 240 (noting the multiple concurrences and dissents).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\24-2\CJP204.txt unknown Seq: 8  2-FEB-15 13:31
360 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 24:353
sual.25  Each Justice provided his own rationale for the Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibition of the arbitrary infliction of the death sentence.
Justice Douglas cited the substantial risk of discrimination that accompa-
nies a jury’s unfettered discretion in death penalty decisions, concluding
that the arbitrary infliction of the death penalty violates the “equal pro-
tection [that] is implicit in ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments.”26  Justice
Brennan condemned unfettered jury discretion for its disproportionate
punishments, which is “[dis]respect[ful] [to] human dignity when, with-
out reason, [the State] inflicts upon some people a severe punishment
that it does not inflict upon others.”27  The other Justices presented com-
paratively conservative rationales based on the general principles of
criminal law (i.e. retribution, deterrence).28  Even though the Justices’
rationales diverged, the Justices reached a consensus that when the sen-
tencing authority has unfettered discretion, the risk of arbitrary sentenc-
ing is too high making the death sentence cruel and unusual
punishment.29
The July 2 Cases,30 led by Gregg v. Georgia, channeled the concur-
rences of the Furman opinion to provide guidance to state legislatures
attempting to retain their death penalty schemes.31  The Gregg court ap-
proved a capital sentencing procedure that required the jury to “find and
identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before it may impose a
25 See id. at 282 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“If a punishment is unusually severe, if there
is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily . . . then the continued infliction of that
punishment violates the command of the Clause that the State may not inflict inhuman and
uncivilized punishment.”). See also id. at 294–95 (“[O]ur procedures in death cases, rather
than resulting in the selection of ‘extreme’ cases for this punishment, actually sanction an
arbitrary selection.  For this Court has held that juries . . . make the decision whether to impose
a death sentence wholly unguided by standards governing that decision.”); id. at 310 (Stewart,
J., concurring) (“[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a
sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and
freakishly imposed.”); id. at 398 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“It is concluded that petitioners’
sentences must be set aside not because the punishment is impermissibly cruel, but because
juries and judges have failed to exercise their sentencing discretion in acceptable fashion.”).
26 Id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
27 Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring).
28 See, e.g., id. at 311–12 (White, J., concurring) (“But when the imposition of the pen-
alty reaches a certain degree of infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing need
for retribution would be measurably satisfied . . . .  Most important, a major goal of the crimi-
nal law—to deter others by punishing the convicted criminal—would not be substantially
served.”).
29 See supra note 25. R
30 The July 2 Cases were a series of Supreme Court decisions, the most prominent being
Gregg v. Georgia, 482 U.S. 153 (1976), that reaffirmed the United States’ use of the death
penalty is not per se cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  The
cases provided the state legislatures with guidance as to the capital sentencing procedures that
ensure the death penalty is not administered in a cruel and unusual fashion.  The Supreme
Court identified two main features: (1) sentencing standards that limit the sentencing discretion
of the jury; and (2) meaningful appellate review of a death sentence.
31 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196–97.
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penalty of death.”32  In the opinion, the Gregg court approved the aggra-
vating factors scheme because it channeled the sentencing authority’s
discretion thereby “minimiz[ing] the risk of wholly arbitrary and capri-
cious action.”33  The Gregg court found that the statutory aggravating
factors scheme directed discretion by “narrow[ing] the class of murderers
subject to capital punishment.”34  Thus, Gregg developed Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence in two ways.  First, Gregg reified the anti-
arbitrariness requirement of Furman.35  Second, Gregg incorporated ag-
gravating circumstances as a legal mechanism that channels the sentenc-
ing authority’s discretion by narrowing the class of defendants eligible
for the death sentence, thereby making the capital scheme not wholly
arbitrary or capricious.36
Zant v. Stephens built upon Gregg by explicitly clarifying why stat-
utory aggravating circumstances reduce the risk of arbitrary and capri-
cious sentencing.37  In Zant, the Georgia Supreme Court described
capital sentencing schemes as a pyramid.38  The base level of the pyra-
mid contains all defendants who committed homicides.39  At the apex of
the period are the defendants that are culpable enough to warrant a death
penalty.40  To reach the apex, defendants must pass through three thresh-
olds that channel the jury’s discretion by requiring the jury to find that
the condition associated with each threshold existed in a particular defen-
dant’s case.41  Statutory aggravating circumstances constitute one of
these intermediary planes.  The statutory aggravating circumstances
plane “separates from all murder cases those in which the penalty of
death is possible.”42  Statutory aggravating circumstances fulfill a “con-
stitutionally necessary function . . . they circumscribe the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty,”43 adequately channeling the jury’s discre-
tion because it cannot impose the death penalty on every defendant
32 Id. at 206.
33 Id. at 189.  While the Gregg court retained the essential components of the arbitrari-
ness standard established in Furman, Gregg increased the burden on the defendant to invali-
date a death penalty scheme on the grounds of arbitrariness.  Instead of having to show that a
scheme allows discretion to the extent that decisions are arbitrary, the defendant must now
show that the scheme presents a situation of “wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” Id.
34 Id. at 196.
35 Id. at 189 (rearticulating the unconstitutionality of an arbitrary decision making pro-
cess in a capital punishment case).
36 Id. at 196–98.
37 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874–75 (1982) (dealing with a homicide capital sen-
tencing scheme, and the statutory aggravating circumstances principle stated in the case ap-
plies to any capital sentencing scheme).
38 Id. at 870.
39 Id. at 871.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 870–71.
42 Id. at 871.
43 Id. at 878.
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charged with a capital crime.  Only statutory aggravating circumstances
that genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty
and reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of a similar crime channel the
jury’s discretion and prevent arbitrary sentencing.44
Gregg and Zant developed the role of statutory-aggravating-circum-
stances schemes where the circumstances were distinct from the ele-
ments of the underlying crime. Lowenfield v. Phelps answered the
question of whether the statutory aggravating circumstance can be an
element of the underlying capital offense.45  The Lowenfield court held
that a death sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment when the
statutory aggravating circumstance that serves as the basis for a defen-
dant’s death eligibility is duplicative of an element of an underlying spe-
cific-intent offense.46  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “the use of
‘aggravating circumstances’ is not an end in itself, but a means of genu-
inely narrowing the class of death-eligible persons, and thereby channel-
ing the jury’s discretion.”47  With a specific-intent offense, the legislature
consolidates the guilt and eligibility phases by requiring the jury to find a
statutory aggravating circumstance as part of the finding of guilt.48  The
legislature “narrow[s] the definition of capital offenses . . . so that the
jury finding of guilt responds to this [narrowing] concern.”49  In essence,
the Lowenfield court held that in making a guilt determination, the jury is
conducting the same statutory aggravating circumstance analysis and
reaching the same conclusion as if a separate eligibility phase was
conducted.50
Thus, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on narrowing stands as fol-
lows: statutory aggravating circumstance can be part of the elements of a
specific-intent offense as long as the statutory aggravating circumstance
genuinely narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty.
Through aggravating circumstances, the jury does not have unfettered
discretion.  The jury is given a meaningful basis for differentiating death
culpable defendants from the non-eligible and the capital punishment
scheme is not arbitrary, nor a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
44 Id. at 877.
45 See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 236 (1988).
46 Id. at 246.
47 Id. at 244.
48 Id. at 246.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 244–46.
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II. THE SUCCESS OF “KNOWLEDGE OF ENEMY RECEIPT” AS AN
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE BEFORE THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE INTERNET
A. The Legislature Establishes a Reasonable Expectation of
Communicational Privacy in Pre-Internet Communication
Systems
Prior to the advent of the Internet, the mediums for transmitting
information were accompanied by a reasonable right to privacy.51
Although the right to privacy is not an explicit protection listed in
the Bill of Rights, the United States Supreme Court found the right exists
in the “penumbras” of the explicitly listed constitutional rights.52  Of
these explicit constitutional rights, the Fourth Amendment supplies the
strongest foundation for a right to communicational privacy.  The Fourth
Amendment provides that the people of the United States possess a right
to be “secure in their persons, house, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.”53  Individuals are entitled to this protec-
tion as long as: (1) society recognizes the expectation of privacy as a
reasonable one; and (2) the individual exhibits an actual expectation of
privacy.54
Society’s recognition of privacy in pre-Internet communication
technologies is evidenced by Congress’s legislation of communications
mediums.55  Congress began recognizing the reasonableness of an expec-
tation of privacy with the Communications Act of 1934.56  The Commu-
nications Act established the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and conferred to the FCC the power to “regulate interstate and
foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make
available . . . communication service[s].”57  The Supreme Court, in inter-
preting the Communications Act of 1934, held that the privacy right en-
shrined in the Act derived from the Fourth Amendment, and that the
“Fourth Amendment is a constraint on government action rather than on
the actions of private individuals.”58  Consequently, the Act criminalized
51 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (“Justice Harlan made it crystal clear that he
was resting on the reality that one who enters a telephone booth is entitled to assume that his
conversation is not being intercepted.”); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1887) (holding that
regulations made for handling letters in transit cannot overcome the Fourth Amendment right
to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure).
52 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
53 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
54 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
55 In the same way Congress is a benchmark for society’s standards of decency, congres-
sional action is the most visible indicator of what society defines as reasonable.
56 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–155 (1934).
57 47 U.S.C. § 151.
58 United States v. Goldstein, 532 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1976).
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government officials’ unauthorized wiretapping while leaving private ac-
tion unaffected.
It was not until 1968 that Congress broadened the right to privacy to
encompass protections from private party interception.  In response to
the vigilantism of both government and private actors seeking to combat
domestic Communism through illegal wiretapping,59 Congress passed
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Omnibus
Act).60  The Omnibus Act prohibited the unauthorized, nonconsensual
interception and publication of “wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tions” by government and private parties.61  The Omnibus Act also estab-
lished procedures for obtaining warrants to authorize wiretapping by
government officials and promulgated regulation for the disclosure and
use of authorized intercepted communications.62
State statutory law has supplemented the Omnibus Act with the en-
actment of “eavesdropping statutes” designed to prevent the overhearing,
recording, amplifying, or transmission of the communications of others
without the consent of at least one of the parties engaged in the commu-
nication.63  Every state has adopted these eavesdropping statutes, with
variations amongst the states over the consent requirements for recording
a conversation.64  The majority of states have adopted a single-party con-
sent model, wherein only one of the parties to the communication needs
to waive the right to privacy.65  A typical single-party consent model can
be found in the Texas Penal Code, which lists as an affirmative defense
to unlawful wiretapping a scenario where “one of the parties to the com-
munication has given prior consent to the interception.”66
The history of the statutes that precede the Internet, both on the
federal and state levels, shows an increased recognition of the reasona-
bleness of the expectation of privacy.  In 1934 Congress, as a conduit for
society, only recognized an expectation of privacy from the government
as reasonable.67  In 1968, the reasonable expectation of privacy extended
to freedom from private party interception with the Omnibus Act.68
59 See Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (exemplifying the police overreach that resulted in the Omni-
bus Act); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
60 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (1968).
61 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511–2515.
62 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516–2519.
63 Travis Triano, Who Watches the Watchmen? Big Brother’s Use of Wiretap Statutes to
Place Civilians in Timeout, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 389, 416 (2012).
64 See, e.g., Cal. Penal. Code § 631(a) (All-party consent); N.Y. Penal Law § 250.00
(One-party consent).
65 Caycee Hampton, Bilateral Consent Wiretap Statutes: Inviting Police Intimidation, 49
CRIM. L. BULL. 504, 511 (2013).
66 4 TEX. PENAL CODE §16.02(c)(3)(A).
67 See 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1940).
68 See Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2511–2515 (2012)); United States v. Goldstein, 532 F.2d 1305, 1311 (9th Cir. 1976).
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Consequently, until the development of the Internet, the controlling prin-
ciple was that society recognizes a right to privacy in communications
where both parties maintain the privacy agreement and each individual
actually believes their communications are protected.  This right, derived
from the Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable search and
seizure, protected parties from unauthorized third-party interception and
access to the privileged communications.
B. The Reasonable Right to Communicational Privacy Enables
Aggravating Circumstances to Genuinely Narrow Offenders to
Produce a Death-Eligible Class
The reasonable expectation of privacy in pre-Internet technologies
established relational parameters in transmissions, bounding transmitters
to a tacit communicational privacy agreement.69  The bounding of the
communication transaction limited death eligibility to a discrete and eas-
ily identifiable class of defendants that either actively violated the pri-
vacy agreement or transacted directly with enemies of the United States.
The tacit privacy agreement made the illegal distribution of infor-
mation an active offense rather than a passive consequence of transmis-
sion.  Parties engaging in transmission through pre-Internet
communications systems reasonably believed that the content of their
transmissions would remain confidential.70  This reasonable belief bars
liability in the event a third party uses the information for injurious pur-
poses because the transmitting party would not possess the mental state
required by the information crimes statutes.71  In transmitting, the parties
were not by default operating with the knowledge that enemies of the
United States would have access to the communication.72  The prosecu-
tion could not rely on a theory of passive and indirect information shar-
ing to prove the defendant had a culpable mental state.  Consequently,
mere transmitters and users of technology without injurious purposes
were immune from death eligibility.  Only two discrete classes of indi-
viduals are death eligible: (1) transmitters who acted contrary to the pri-
vacy agreement and deliberately disseminated the information to third
parties that intended to use the information to harm the United States;
69 See Matt Greenberg, Case Note, Law Enforcement Officers with Clean Hands May
Not Make Investigative Use of a Wiretap that Was Illegally Acquired by a Third Party: Berry
v. Funk, 14 F.3d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1998), 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 463, 492 (2000).
70 See Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“One
who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is
surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to
the world.”).
71 See Hampton, supra note 65, at 3. R
72 This assumes that the party did not transmit the information firsthand to a party who
the transmitting party has reason to believe would use the information in a manner injurious to
the United States.
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and (2) individuals who transmit information directly to enemies of the
United States.  The former death-eligible class is comprised of transmit-
ters who actively consented to disclosure of information to these injuri-
ous third parties or were third parties who violated the privacy agreement
by intercepting privacy-protected communications.  Third party or pri-
mary party, this first class of individuals willfully broke a tacit privacy
agreement to share information with enemies of the United States.  Par-
ties who deliberately chose to directly engage in information transactions
with enemies compose the latter class.  With both classes of death-eligi-
ble defendants, the defendant needed to actively distribute the informa-
tion to known enemies of the United States.
Thus, the right to privacy inherent to pre-Internet technologies pro-
duced discrete and identifiable classes of death-eligible defendants by
making the worst offenders easily identifiable because of either their ac-
tive violation of a tacit privacy agreement or their direct transacting with
enemies of the United States.
C. An Example of the Reasonable Expectation of Communicational
Privacy’s Effect on Narrowing Circumstances: The Espionage
Act of 1917 and the Rosenberg Trial
Congress enacted the Espionage Act of 1917 with the same ratio-
nale it would use to ratify § 904 as part of the UCMJ.73  The Espionage
Act’s purpose was to “punish acts of interference with the foreign rela-
tions, and the foreign commerce of the United States, to punish espio-
nage,” and to hold individuals who commit acts injurious to the United
States criminally liable.74  The Espionage Act’s capital punishment sec-
tion, “Gathering or Delivering Defense Information to Aid Foreign Gov-
ernment,” prohibits the wartime transmission of information to foreign
governments that the transmitter has reason to believe will use the infor-
mation to injure the United States.75  This section employs a statutory
aggravating factor similar to § 904’s implicit aggravating factor; the per-
son transmitting the information must have “intent or reason to believe
that it is used to the injury of the United States.”76  It was under the
“Gathering or Delivering Defense Information to Aid Foreign Govern-
73 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–799 (2012).  Congress ratified § 904 before the Internet, but in the
period between the ratification of the statute and the creation of the Internet there were no
prosecutions under the statute.  To observe how capital prosecutions for non-homicide related
crimes functioned prior to the Internet, it is necessary to use prosecutions under a historical
corollary of § 904.  Accordingly, the Espionage Act of 1917 and prosecutions under the Act
will be the substitute for § 904 in the period preceding the Internet.
74 Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917).
75 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
76 Id.
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ment” section, subject to the implicit statutory aggravating factor, that
the United States prosecuted and executed Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.
The United States government alleged that the Rosenbergs transmit-
ted confidential information about the atomic bomb to the Soviet
Union.77  The primary witness was Ethel Rosenberg’s brother, David
Greenglass.78  Greenglass was an army employee at Los Alamos labora-
tory in New Mexico when the Rosenbergs recruited him to aid in their
espionage activities.79  The Rosenbergs controlled the actions of Green-
glass, acting in a principal and agent relationship.  During his time at Los
Alamos, Greenglass utilized his position as a sergeant with the United
States Army to engage nuclear scientists about the details of the Manhat-
tan Project.80  At trial, Greenglass testified that he provided Ethel with
schematics of the atomic bombs from the Los Alamos nuclear plant.81
Ethel then transcribed the notes containing U.S. nuclear secrets and pro-
vided them to her husband Julius, who maintained direct contact with
agents from the Ministry for State Security of the Soviet Union.82  In
addition to his role as a courier, Julius Rosenberg acted as a recruiter for
the Soviets in the United States by funding college students with Soviet
money to establish contacts in the American intelligence network and
among the universities of the United States.83
The Rosenberg case is helpful because it is illustrative of both clas-
ses of defendants eligible for the death sentence when a reasonable right
to privacy existed in communication systems.
The communications between Greenglass and those nuclear scien-
tists, which took place primarily through telephone conversations and
written company memos, retained a reasonable right to privacy on behalf
of the scientists.84  The scientists were insulated from liability because
society recognized the right to privacy that adhered to the communica-
tions between themselves and Greenglass, and the scientists exhibited an
actual belief that their transmissions were privacy protected.  The scien-
tists distributed details of the nuclear program to Greenglass in a profes-
77 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1952).
78 The Associated Press, David Greenglass, Spy Who Sent Sister Ethel Rosenberg to
Electric Chair, Dies, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 14, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
oct/15/david-greenglass-spy-who-sent-sister-ethel-rosenberg-to-electric-chair-dies.
79 Note, The Rosenberg Case: Some Reflections on Federal Criminal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 219, 220 (1954).
80 Paul Valentine, David Greenglass, Central Figure in Cold War Atomic Spy Case, Dies
at 92, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/david-greenglass-
central-figure-in-cold-war-atomic-spy-case-dies-at-92/2014/10/14/6339be3e-5094-11e4-8c24-
487e92bc997b_story.html.
81 Rosenberg, 195 F.2d at 589.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Valentine, supra note 80. R
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sional context under the presumption that he had authorization and
legitimate purposes, and that the information would not be accessible by
third parties with injurious designs.85  No interpretation of the communi-
cation transactions had the scientists actively violating the privacy agree-
ment, nor giving consent to distribute the information to a third party.
The scientists had no “reason to believe that [the information] would be
used to injure the United States.”86  Thus, a reasonable expectation of
communicational privacy exculpated the scientists through a categorical
undermining of the mens rea requirement of the Espionage Act’s capital
punishment section.  This result is consistent with the aims of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of arbitrary and capricious imposition of the
death penalty, as the nuclear scientists in the Rosenberg trial were the
least culpable of all the actors.87  Neither by design, nor by negligence
did the nuclear scientists involve themselves in the conspiracy to provide
aid to the Soviet Union, making it cruel and unusual to impose any legal
punishment on them, least of all capital punishment.
In contrast to the scientists, Greenglass entered into his relationship
with the scientists with the intention of violating the privacy agree-
ment.88  He was the first class of death-eligible offender: a transmitter
who acted contrary to the privacy agreement and deliberately dissemi-
nated the information to third parties that intended to use the information
to harm the United States.  Greenglass entered into a tacit privacy agree-
ment with the scientists then willfully broke the agreement to transmit
the information with the Rosenbergs for compensation.  Greenglass knew
the money was coming from the Soviet Union and that the information
he was sharing would undermine the United States’ strength during the
Cold War.  Greenglass affirmatively waived the right to a bound transac-
tion by sharing with the Rosenbergs the schematics of the nuclear weap-
ons and the content of the conversations conducted between himself and
the nuclear scientists.  It is the action of sharing with the Rosenbergs, and
not partaking in the original conversations with the scientists, which im-
plicates Greenglass as the active violator of the reasonable expectation of
privacy.  Unlike the scientists, Greenglass could not appeal to the right to
privacy to undermine his mens rea because it was his decisions to waive
the right.  Consequently, Greenglass was death eligible as an active vio-
lator of the tacit privacy agreement he entered into.  Greenglass’s eligi-
bility is not an arbitrary result, but instead is consistent with his
culpability.  Unlike the nuclear scientists, Greenglass was an active par-
ticipant in espionage that injured the United States.  In the relationship
85 Id.
86 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
87 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
88 Valentine, supra note 80. R
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between Greenglass and the scientists, the narrowing function produced a
result that was neither arbitrary, nor capricious.
The Rosenbergs were eligible for the death penalty as the second
class of offenders: individuals who transmit directly to enemies of the
United States.  The Rosenbergs did not break a tacit privacy agreement
like Greenglass.  Instead, the Rosenbergs passed along state secrets to
Soviet agents they knew to be enemies of the United States.  The Soviet
Union’s status as an enemy to the United States was uncontroversial;
therefore, unlike Greenglass’s dealings with the nuclear scientists, it was
the original conversation with the Soviet agents and not the breaking of
any privacy agreement that made the Rosenbergs death eligible.  The ex-
istence of a reasonable right to communicational privacy did not affect
the Rosenbergs’ death eligibility  It did, however, affect the prosecutor’s
decision to seek execution for the Rosenbergs and not for Greenglass,
thereby channeling prosecutorial discretion and ensuring that the prose-
cutor’s decision of when to seek the death penalty was not arbitrary or
capricious.
In corroboration with a Soviet handler named Anatoliy Yatskov, the
Rosenbergs recruited Greenglass and his wife into the Soviet spy net-
work and used Greenglass’s authority to access nuclear secrets.89  Al-
though the prosecution was able to implicate Greenglass as the
information leak, it could only establish minimal contacts between
Greenglass and agents of the Soviet Union.90  This was because the ac-
tive violation of the privacy agreement between Greenglass and the nu-
clear scientists only implicated Greenglass as a participant in the
conspiracy, but did not establish his role.  It was the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy that adhered to the transmissions between the Rosenbergs
and the Soviet agents that assigned roles and associated culpabilities to
the Rosenbergs and Greenglass.  The Rosenbergs did not violate a pri-
vacy agreement to make them death eligible, but instead transacted with
people they knew to be enemies of the United States.  Ironically,
throughout the conspiracy the Rosenbergs maintained the privacy agree-
ment guaranteed by a reasonable right to privacy.  The information chain
between the Soviet agents and Greenglass went one direction: from
Greenglass, to the Rosenbergs, and then to the Soviet agents.  The lack of
reverse communication made the roles clear: Greenglass’s was an
“agent” of the Rosenbergs, who acted as “principals” responsible for pro-
curing and transmitting the nuclear information to the Soviet Union.  The
prosecution’s assignment of culpability was consistent with these roles.
The prosecution, based on the information chain that stemmed from the
breaches, concluded that the Rosenbergs were the most culpable offend-
89 See United States. v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 588–89 (2d Cir. 1952).
90 Id. at 527.
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ers while Greenglass was merely a cog in that network that did not war-
rant capital punishment.  As the principals, the prosecution charged the
Rosenbergs with the capital offense while the prosecution pled out
Greenglass.91  Thus, the reasonable expectation of communicational pri-
vacy produced privacy agreements, which allowed for the meaningful
differentiation of death-eligible defendants, thereby ameliorating any
concerns of arbitrariness in the Rosenberg case.
D. Conclusion from the Pre-Internet Era of Communications
Technology
Both federal and state legislatures established a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy for pre-Internet communications technologies.  This rea-
sonable expectation of privacy enables aggravating factors to genuinely
narrow the class of defendants to a non-arbitrary death-eligible group by
binding transmitters to a tacit privacy agreement that must be actively
violated for culpability to adhere.  Those active violators of the privacy
agreement are the worst offenders who knowingly shared information
with an enemy of the United States.  There is a meaningful basis for
distinguishing death-eligible defendants, meaning that the death penalty
under these schemes was not cruel and unusual punishment.
III. THE IMPACT OF NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY FOR
INTERNET USERS ON THE “KNOWLEDGE OF ENEMY RECEIPT”
CIRCUMSTANCE IN § 904
A. Jurisprudence Asserting No Reasonable Expectation of
Communicational Privacy for Internet Transmissions
Although the legislature was central in establishing a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in pre-Internet communications systems, the judici-
ary has been the institution to issue a policy dealing with a reasonable
expectation of communicational privacy over the Internet through its re-
cent jurisprudence.
Courts have consistently held that unlike prior information-transmit-
ting technologies, the Internet does not retain the same reasonable expec-
tation of privacy particularly when those transmissions occur through
web site postings.92  The Southern District of New York most recently
codified this principle in the Meregildo case.93  In Meregildo, the defen-
dant was a gang member who not only posted evidence of his thefts and
assaults on his Facebook page, but also maintained a running account of
91 Id. at 588.
92 See, e.g., United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
93 Id.
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crimes he committed and future crimes he intended to commit.94  When
the police discovered the evidence on the defendant’s Facebook page and
found through his posting history that he had detailed the alleged crimes
with specificity, they obtained a warrant and arrested the defendant.95
The prosecution charged the defendant with racketeering, assault, and
grand larceny with probable cause entirely predicated on the information
from the Facebook page.96  The defendant argued that the invasion of his
social networking page to secure a warrant for arrest violated the defen-
dant’s Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable search
and seizure.  The defendant posited that he had a reasonable expectation
of privacy for the content on his Facebook page because the accessibility
of the content on his personal page was restricted exclusively to his
Facebook friends, associates who the defendant had consented to sharing
his content with.97  The defendant concluded that only he could waive
his privacy right by consenting to a search of the information on his
Facebook page by the police, and that he had never consented to the
search that produced the evidence against him.98
The court disposed of the defendant’s claim in two ways.  First,
operating under the presumption that a privacy right could exist for In-
ternet communications, the court held that the power to waive the reason-
able expectation did not vest solely with the Facebook user.99  According
to the court, a cooperating witness who is a “friend” could consent to a
waiver of the right to privacy on behalf of the Facebook poster without
violating the Fourth Amendment.100  The friend can consent to the
waiver of the right to privacy because the friend, upon delivery of infor-
mation through the Internet, has discretion to utilize the delivered infor-
mation in any way he conceives.101  The friend possesses this discretion
with the material of the Facebook user because the Facebook user has
consented to an online relationship in which the recipient has freedom of
informational use through the acceptance of the friend request that vests
informational power in the online friend.102
The Meregildo court then dealt with the expectation of privacy and
its relation to social networking, web site postings, and Internet transmis-
sion.  The court reasoned that a reasonable expectation of privacy ad-
heres to content stored on a home computer, but when the content is
94 Id. at 525–26.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 524.
97 Id. at 525.
98 Id. at 526.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
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transmitted the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy might extin-
guish, particularly in the context of a social networking website.103  The
Meregildo court reached this conclusion on social networking for reasons
similar to those elucidated in a case that preceded Meregildo by two
years, Romano v. Steelcase, Inc.104 Romano held that the very nature
and purpose of social networking sites, public Internet webpages, and
blogs were to share personal postings with others.105  According to Ro-
mano, users of these technologies engage them because of the “knowl-
edge” that the information becomes publicly available through
transmissions and that if this were not true, social networking would
cease to exist.106  The effect of Romano is that parties transmitting infor-
mation over the Internet do not carry a right to privacy that can insulate a
defendant from search and seizure or undermine the mens rea require-
ments of capital punishment statutes for information crimes.  The reason-
able expectation of privacy of pre-Internet technologies is not
translatable to the Internet because the Internet is an open-source me-
dium created with the purpose of complete global connectivity.107  As
the Meregildo court reasoned, while an Internet user may honestly be-
lieve that their profiles and the information on those profiles are private
to the Facebook user and his Facebook friends, this is not a reasonable
expectation because the Internet has expanded the circle of “friends” that
can access transmitted information to viewers including “someone . . .
never expected to see them.”108  The default standard for hosting and
transmitting information over the Internet is that the user “[surrenders]
his expectation of privacy . . . by [sharing] those posts with his ‘friends’
at his peril.”109  The “peril” the Meregildo court is referencing is the
dissemination of the user’s information to parties that the original user
could not have foreseen.
In conclusion, Meregildo and Romano collectively embody the prin-
ciple that because Internet websites are transmission forums premised on
information connectivity, it is not reasonable for an Internet user to at-
tempt to limit their liability by asserting that a privacy right exists.110
Users engage websites with the purpose of mass distribution of their per-
sonal information.  Consequently, the default condition for Internet users
103 Id. at 525–26.
104 Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
105 See id. at 656–57.
106 Id.
107 Id. (“‘Users would logically lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in materials in-
tended for publication or public posting.’” (quoting United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173,
190 (2d Cir. 2004))).
108 Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
109 Id.
110 See id.; Romano, 907 N.Y.S. 2d at 656.
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must be that a reasonable expectation of privacy does not exist when they
transmit and host information on a website.
B. The Impact of the Loss of a Reasonable Expectation of
Communicational Privacy on § 904: Undermining “Knowledge
of Enemy Receipt”
The reasonable expectation of privacy in transmissions prior to the
Internet enabled the “knowledge of enemy receipt” circumstance to per-
form its narrowing function to prevent arbitrary death sentencing by es-
tablishing tacit privacy agreements between transmitting parties that
needed to be actively violated in order for a defendant to be death eligi-
ble.  The need for a defendant to actively violate a privacy agreement
provided a meaningful basis for differentiating the most culpable defend-
ants from those who did not deserve to be death eligible; therefore, death
penalties administered for information crimes prior to the Internet were
not cruel and unusual and did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
Section 904 has an implicit aggravating circumstance—knowledge
of enemy receipt of the information—which is similar to the implicit
circumstance of the Espionage Act.  To comport with the Eighth Amend-
ment, this implicit statutory aggravating circumstance must genuinely
narrow the class of death-eligible defendants to a discrete and identifi-
able group of offenders who are sufficiently culpable to warrant execu-
tion.  Yet because of the judicial precedent that has determined there is
no reasonable expectation of communicational privacy over the Internet,
the circumstance does not genuinely narrow offenders eligible for death,
but leaves the sentencing authority to exercise unfettered discretion in
determining which defendants should receive the death sentence.
Romano held that a right to privacy did not adhere to Internet trans-
missions because the purpose of a website and the Internet writ large is
to allow users to disseminate their information on a global scale.111  The
case established that the default mental state for users of the Internet is
not the same as pre-Internet technologies.112  Internet users cannot rea-
sonably expect their information transmissions to be private, but instead
operate with the knowledge that the Internet inherently makes their trans-
missions accessible to unintended third parties, including enemies of the
United States.  This bears on § 904 because the implicit aggravating cir-
cumstance of knowledge of receipt by an enemy is satisfied by all In-
ternet transmitters, who according to Romano are knowledgeable about
the potential accessibility of their transmissions by unforeseen parties
worldwide, including enemies of the United States.113  No longer must
111 Romano, 907 N.Y.S. 2d at 656.
112 Id. at 657.
113 Id.
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there be an active violation of a privacy agreement for a defendant to be
death eligible.  Instead, death eligibility under § 904 is a passive conse-
quence of transmitting information over the Internet.  Consequently,
§ 904’s statutory aggravating circumstance does not provide a meaning-
ful basis for establishing a discrete and identifiable death-eligible class,
but instead affords the sentencing authority unfettered discretion to de-
cide who should be death eligible from an impermissibly broad class of
all Internet users who transmit information that can be construed as bene-
ficial to an enemy of the United States.  “Knowledge of enemy receipt”
does not genuinely narrow the class of defendants eligible for death, but
instead produces the unconstitutionally high risk of arbitrary decision
that Furman held to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
C. Exemplifying the Constitutional Infirmities of § 904 Through
Edward Snowden
Both Manning’s and Snowden’s cases implicate the constitutional
infirmities of § 904 by designating both individuals death eligible with-
out a substantive distinction between them and the other actors who par-
took in the release of classified information to enemies of the United
States.
The theories of death eligibility for both Manning and Snowden
under § 904 would be that the two released information to media outlets
that posted the information directly to the Internet with the knowledge
that the information would indirectly reach Al Qaeda.114  The prosecu-
tion would rely on the lack of a right to privacy to prove the mens rea of
the statutory aggravating circumstance, arguing that by giving the infor-
mation to entities with global distribution networks on the Internet,
Snowden and Manning possessed the requisite knowledge that enemies
would receive the confidential information.115  The requisite mens rea
and the classified nature of the information established, the prosecution
would conclude that Snowden and Manning are death eligible.116  With
Snowden and Manning, the purported narrowing would occur through
showing that the defendants knew enemies of the United States would
receive the information.  This line of argument is problematic, however,
because the same prosecutorial logic would hold the media outlets and
the Internet users death eligible as well.
Isolating the Snowden case, Edward Snowden, the primary party,
transmitted the operational details of the NSA to the Washington Post,
the secondary party.  Prior to his contact with the Washington Post,
Snowden had not disclosed the confidential information on the Internet
114 Peralta, supra note 6. R
115 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
116 Peralta, supra note 6. R
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or to any other media outlet.117  Snowden had stolen the NSA operational
manual, but his resources limited the impact of disclosure.118  Only
Snowden knew the contents of the operational manual of the NSA, and
he had little circulatory power until he joined with the Washington Post.
Snowden gave the classified information to the Washington Post.119
With knowledge that Snowden acquired the information without proper
authorization, and with a network that extends across the globe, the
newspaper published the information both in print and online.120
Through publication on the Internet, the Washington Post knew that the
information would reach enemies of the United States and would materi-
ally benefit those enemies.121  Thus, the newspaper qualifies as death
eligible under § 904 as it fulfills the statutory aggravating circumstance
implicit to the statute; however, the newspaper is not subject to prosecu-
tion.122  This is problematic because it is a viable argument that the
Washington Post is “worst of the worst” in this information conspiracy.
There are three reasons why the Washington Post is arguably the
most culpable actor in the Snowden scenario: legitimation, distribution,
and profit.  Without the Washington Post, the impact of Snowden’s dis-
closure as an individual would have relied upon his own credibility.
When the Washington Post offered to publish the confidential informa-
tion, it immediately validated Snowden’s information and provided him
with the global network to heighten drastically the visibility of the unau-
thorized disclosure.  Furthermore, unlike Snowden, the Washington Post
profited from the worldwide circulation of the classified information.
The Washington Post’s very purpose for publishing the documents was
to promote global readership of the classified documents and garner sub-
scriptions.  Despite these facts, the Washington Post was not subject to
prosecution even though a straightforward application of the elements of
§ 904 would place the newspaper into the death-eligible class.123
Although the Internet users who repost the information could not be
condemned as the worst offenders in the information conspiracy, they
too are death eligible under the statutory aggravating circumstance of
§ 904.  To reiterate, the statutory aggravating circumstance implicit to
117 See Barton Gellman, Code Name ‘Verax’, WASH. POST, June 9, 2013, http://www
.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/code-name-verax-snowden-in-exchanges-with-
post-reporter-made-clear-he-knew-risks/2013/06/09/c9a25b54-d14c-11e2-9f1a-1a7cdee20287
_story.html.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See Peralta, supra note 6. R
122 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
123 Yochai Benkler, Bradley Manning ‘Aiding the Enemy’ Charge Is a Threat to Journal-
ism, THE GUARDIAN, July 19, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/19/
bradley-manning-trial-aiding-the-enemy-charge.
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§ 904 is the knowledge of enemy receipt.  The secondary party of In-
ternet users is death eligible under this circumstance because the party
takes the confidential information that benefits enemies of the United
States and, without authorization, increases the Internet visibility of the
documents.  By replicating the information on the Internet, the average
user, because of the default presumption established by Romano, pos-
sesses the requisite mens rea of knowledge that the information will have
a global reach to enemies of the United States because it is by default not
privacy protected according to judicial precedent.124  Consequently, an
average Internet user who replicates the information on the Internet could
be liable for capital prosecution under the current iteration of § 904, and
yet the prosecutor has again exercised his discretion without a statutorily
defined meaningful basis for not prosecuting these secondary parties.125
Through the Snowden case, it is clear § 904’s implicit aggravating
circumstance of knowledge of enemy receipt is not producing a narrow
class of death-eligible defendants who are classified as such because of
their culpability, but is instead providing a basis for prosecutors and ju-
rors alike to arbitrarily decide which defendants are suitable for execu-
tion.  In practice, the narrowing that occurs in § 904 is the product of
practical constraints and prosecutorial discretion rather than through the
implicit aggravating circumstance as required by Furman.  As
Snowden’s case reveals, the lack of an implicit aggravating circumstance
that genuinely narrows the class of defendants gives the sentencing au-
thority unfettered discretion that leads to arbitrary decision making
which allows the worst offender to escape liability.  The purpose of ag-
gravating circumstances is to genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible
defendants for creating a death-eligible class of offender and under the
implicit aggravating circumstance of § 904, this function is not being
performed.
As a final note, there are those who would counter the argument
advanced by this Note that the current § 904 gives the prosecutor and
jury unfettered discretion, resulting in arbitrary prosecutorial decisions
and death sentencing that does not penalize the most culpable offenders.
The counterargument would be that § 904 results in the most culpable
offender being death eligible in all scenarios because it is a military pros-
ecutor who exercises discretion.  This counterargument would posit that
Congress was aware of the broad discretion afforded to the military tri-
bunal and military officers in determining a class of death-eligible de-
fendants when § 904 was ratified.  Congress still ratified §904 and
provided this unfettered discretion exclusively to the military because of
the belief that military prosecutors are the only individuals positioned to
124 Romano v. Steelcase, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
125 10 U.S.C. § 904.
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prosecute in the interests of national security because of their access to
classified military intel.  When applied to the Snowden case, this
counterargument would conclude that the military prosecutor determined
that Edward Snowden represented a more substantial threat to national
security than did the Washington Post on the basis of classified military
intel and that the judgment should be given deference as it comes from
the expertise of a military officer who understands the exigencies of
security.
There are areas where the exigencies of war call for deference to
military decision making.  Where the potential injustice outweighs the
need for deference, however, the Supreme Court has reviewed the case
with the same scrutiny as in civilian courts.  Illustrative of this is United
States v. Tempia, a case implicating Miranda rights.  In Tempia, an of-
ficer (Tempia) was accused of misconduct while off base and demanded
counsel during his interrogation by military officers.126  Tempia was told
that the Staff Judge Advocate would be unable to assist in the case, so
Tempia confessed.127  Tempia’s defense counsel later sought to have his
confession excluded under the rationale that Tempia was not afforded
proper counsel.128  Though it was a case dealing with military miscon-
duct, the military commission recognized that Miranda rights were still
afforded to Tempia because the court-martial system of justice operates
in a dual capacity, to ensure “justice would be done to both the individual
accused and to the military establishment of which the accused was a
part.”129  The administration of the death penalty is an area where the
potential injustice is of a magnitude that outweighs potential security
concerns which would justify deference.  This judgment about the death
penalty is reflected in the court-martial’s appellate review system.  28
U.S.C. § 1259 empowers the Supreme Court with the discretion to re-
view cases under the UCMJ on direct appeal where the United States
Court of Appeals of Armed Forces has conducted a mandatory review,130
and the United States Court of Appeals of Armed Forces is mandated to
review all death penalty cases under the UCMJ.131  Thus, even though
national security requires military deference in certain issue areas, the
Supreme Court has extended civilian constitutional standards to military
action in cases where the potential injustice in not extending the protec-
tion outweighs the need for deference.
126 State v. Tempia, 16 C.M.A. 629, 632 (1967).
127 James F. Falco, United States v. Tempia: The Questionable Application of Miranda to
the Military, 13 VILL. L. REV. 170, 172 (1967).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 183.
130 28 U.S.C. § 1259 (2012).
131 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2012).
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IV. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS AND CONCLUSION
Section 904 in its current incarnation is constitutionally infirm.  The
aggravating circumstance implicit to the statute does not provide a mean-
ingful basis for distinguishing death-eligible defendants from those who
should not be eligible for capital sanction.  This is because the “knowl-
edge of enemy receipt” requirement that the statute relies on to circum-
scribe the defendant class has become an accepted principle for parties
that transmit information over the Internet.132  The Internet did not retain
the right to privacy that adhered to pre-Internet communications technol-
ogy, which resulted in the judiciary determining that users of the Internet
presumptively operate with the knowledge that the information they post
and transmit through the Internet is accessible by unforeseen parties
worldwide, parties including enemies of the United States.  Conse-
quently, any Internet user who hosts or transmits information perceived
to be detrimental to the United States is eligible for capital sanction
under the statute.  This class is impermissibly large and does not channel
the jury’s discretion sufficiently, thereby making § 904 inconsistent with
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual
punishment.”133
For the statute to comport with the Eighth Amendment, Congress
must amend the mens rea requirement of § 904 and increase the burden
to purposeful sharing of information to enemies of the United States.
Additionally, the courts should presume that the purpose for information
disclosure was to reach an enemy combatant and then allow the defen-
dant to rebut that presumption with the defendant’s burden of proof con-
tingent upon whether the defendant was a primary or secondary party.
As a secondary party, most Internet users could exculpate themselves
with ease.  Users could assert that although they knew that the posted
information might reach an enemy, their connection to the enemy com-
batants who received the information was so tenuous that it is highly
implausible the user purposefully put the information online to give to an
enemy third party.  Furthermore, the media outlets could also exculpate
themselves from liability by asserting that the purposes for disseminating
the confidential information were business motivated and not related to
undermining United States national security.  The primary parties, in-
cluding Manning and Snowden, would face a higher burden to show that
their purpose was not to disseminate the information to enemies of the
United States.  These primary parties would need to show that purposeful
distribution to enemy combatants was not even an incidental motivator to
their unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.
132 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
133 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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Regardless, in order to withstand Eighth Amendment scrutiny, Con-
gress must amend § 904’s implicit statutory aggravating circumstance so
that it genuinely narrows the class of offenders eligible for the death
sentence.  This amendment must reflect the advent of the Internet and the
default mental state its users maintain: knowledge.  Unless Congress up-
dates § 904 to reflect the unreasonableness of an expectation of privacy,
§ 904 will be found to have an impermissibly high risk of arbitrary sen-
tencing that makes the punishment “cruel and unusual” in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.134
134 Id.
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